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I PARTIES, 
All parties to this action are listed in the caption, above. Of those parties, only 
Tooele City and Tooele Associates, LP, are parties to this appeal. 
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IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), this Court has jurisdiction to review the 
trial court's June 3, 2010 decision, striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial. 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court acted within its discretion in 
striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial, either because the jury's special verdicts 
were irreconcilably inconsistent or on some alternative ground. (R. 24264-309.) 
The applicable standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard. Tooele 
Associates, L.P. ("TA") asserts that "no Utah appellate court appears to have directly 
addressed the standard of review to be employed." (TA'sBrf. 1.) TA is wrong. 
Rasmussen v. Sharapta, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), holds that the abuse of 
discretion standard applies to the review of a trial court's disposition of a motion for a 
new trial predicated on inconsistency in the jury's special verdict. Id. at 396-97. 
The application of the abuse of discretion standard also is supported by case law 
construing Utah R. Civ. P. 59. The trial court's June 3, 2010 mistrial decision was an « 
application of Rule 59(d), and "[u]nder our Rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general 
matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial." 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 803-05 (Utah 1991). This standard of review 
applies to mistrial decisions because 
the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses and had a first-hand view of 
all of the evidence, and the proceedings throughout the trial and has ruled 
on the admissibility of the evidence, and instructed the jury on the law 
governing their verdict, and had opportunity of observing the tactics of the 
counsel throughout the trial and jury's reaction thereto. . . . 
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Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 704 (Utah 1961); Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 
379,TJ14, 173 P.3d865. 
A first-hand view of trial proceedings is important in deciding whether 
inconsistent jury verdicts can be reconciled. "The district judge, who has observed the 
jury during the trial, prepared the special verdict questions and explained them to the 
jury, is in the best position to determine whether the answers reflect confusion or 
uncertainty.'" Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Hauserv.Kubalak. 929 F.2d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1991)); Bonin v. Tour West Inc., 896 
F.2d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 1990); Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 
1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1988); Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. v. Int'l Engraving Co., 528 
F.2d 1272, 1276 (1st Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976). TA itself argues that 
"harmonizing a jury verdict [requires] consideration of] the verdict from the jury's 
perspective - requiring the court to consider the jury verdict form and the 'case as 
submitted' to the jury, including jury instructions and the evidence and arguments 
presented at trial." (TA's Brf. 44 (emphasis in original).) Because the trial court is in the 
best position to consider the case "from the jury's perspective," the abuse of discretion 
standard applies. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition In Court 
Below. 
This is a complex case regarding a real estate development project in Tooele City, 
known as Overlake. The course of proceedings was dominated by extensive motion 
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practice by the City to limit TA's expansive breach of the Development Agreement 
claims. 
TA initiated this case on June 5, 2002, alleging that the City breached the 
Development Agreement with respect to the City's expenditures of park and recreation 
impact fees outside of Overlake. (R. 1, 23-24.) On September 22, 2004, the trial court 
granted the City's Rule 56 motion and dismissed with prejudice TA's only breach of the 
Development Agreement claim.1 (R. 2311.) 
A month later, on October 20, 2004, TA sought leave to file a First Amended 
Complaint, accusing the City of numerous breaches of the Development Agreement. (R. 
2364-67, 2369-74.) The City opposed TA's First Amended Complaint, first, with an 
opposition to TA's motion to amend that demonstrated the legal futility of many of TA's 
breach allegations. (R. 3582, 3584-97.) Thereafter, the City succeeded in limiting and 
narrowing TA's breach claims through summary judgment motions. (R. 10743, 10756, 
18898, 20836, Tooele Assocs., L.P. v. Tooele City, 2011 UT App 36, 675 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 22.) The City's success is evident from the reduction in TA's alleged damages, 
which went from "in excess of $67 million" (which meant about $200 million, according 
to TA's Rule 26(a)(1)(c) initial damages disclosure2) to between $4,764,511.40 and 
1
 The judge who made that ruling and every other ruling of a dispositive nature in 
this case was Judge Randall N. Skancky. Judge Skanchy has presided over this case for 
eight of its nine years. In fact, the case followed Judge Skanchy in 2006 from his bench 
in Tooele County to his courtroom in Salt Lake County. (R. at 6886-87.) 
2
 R. at 3924,3943-44. 
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$6,700,124.40, according to TA's alleged damages statement in the June 11, 2009 Pre-
Trial Order.3 (R. 3829, 21910-12.) 
In one of the City's Rule 56 motions, the City advanced its position that TA's 
failure to complete public improvements in Overlake, i.e., streets, sidewalks, curb and 
gutter, etc., allowed the City to deny new phase or plat requests. (R. 11516-17.) The 
City has always claimed that TA's failure to complete the public improvements was a 
legal basis on which it could deny new plat requests, and the City has always identified 
the Bond Agreements as grounds for such legal basis.4 (R. 4516, 21856.) 
TA incredibly asserts that "[i]t was not until after trial" when the City advanced 
the Bond Agreements as support for its position that TA's public improvement 
deficiencies allowed the City to deny new plats. (TA's Brf. 15, 29 n.25.) TA's assertion 
is categorically false. The City advanced the Bond Agreements as grounds to deny new 
phases in its answers to TA's first and second amended complaints and in the June 11, 
2009 Pre-Trial Order. (R. 4516, 13520, 21856, 21915.) 
The City's Bond Agreement position was also the subject of extensive Rule 56 
motion practice, the outcome of which set the stage for the trial. On December 12, 2007, 
3
 The Pre-Trial Order was actually finalized and adopted by the parties and the 
trial court in the middle of trial, on the same day TA rested its case-in-chief. (R. at 
21921-22,21925.) 
4
 According to TA, "the City claimed that the Development Agreement was to 
receive the 'death penalty.'" (TA's Brf. 15.) The City never used such a hyperbolic 
phrase as "death penalty." The City simply claimed, in accordance with plain Bond 
Agreement terms to which TA voluntarily assented, that TA's failure to complete public 
improvements in conformance with TA's own construction plans allowed the City to 
deny new subdivision phases. 
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the City filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Denial of New Phases 
Due to Incomplete Public Improvements, in which the City asserted that there was no 
genuine dispute that TA's public improvements were incomplete, and, as a matter of law, 
such non-completion allowed the City to invoke the Bond Agreements to deny TA's new 
plat requests. (R. 11516-17, 11525-26, 11541.) In its opposition, TA contended that the 
improvements were, in fact, complete, and even if the improvements were incomplete, 
TA argued, such non-completion provided no legal basis to deny new phases. (R. 12861, 
12870, 12913-14, 12925-26, 12932-33.) 
In an August 13,2008 Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court held that 
there were material fact disputes concerning whether the City waived its rights to claim, 
or should be estopped from claiming, that TA failed to complete the public 
improvements. (R. 14362.) The trial court did, however, conclude, as a matter of law, 
that "the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases 
based upon incomplete public improvements." (R. 14351.) That legal conclusion 
became the law of the case, which would become an important part of the City's trial 
strategy. 
Also setting the trial stage was the Pre-Trial Order. On January 15, 2009, the trial 
court directed the parties to prepare a pre-trial order. (R. 18778; 22694, pp. 57-58.) 
Therein, the City was careful to preserve its position that the Bond Agreements entitled 
the City to deny TA's new phase requests. (R. 21856.) 
In addition, the City fought to ensure that the legal rulings that it previously won 
would not be lost in trial proceedings and that TA could not shift its alleged damages 
5 
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calculations. During an April 9, 2009 pre-trial conference, the City persuaded the trial 
court, over TA's objections, to allow the inclusion within the Pre-Trial Order of a section 
for "MATTERS FOUND AND/OR RESOLVED BY THE COURT5'5 and require TA to 
include a clear'statement of its alleged damages. (R. 24656, pp. 94-95.) One of the 
"matters found" or "resolved by the Court" included in the Pre-Trial Order was the trial 
court's legal conclusion that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City 
to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements.'" (R. 21874, f^ 32 
(quoting R. 14351).) 
TA included in the Pre-Trial Order a statement of its alleged damages, which 
made clear that all of its alleged damages depended upon the ability to develop additional 
lots in further phases of Overlake. (R. 21909.) Specifically, TA demanded as damages 
the value of the culinary water that the City agreed in the Development Agreement to 
provide for TA "at build out,"6 which TA calculated by multiplying the alleged value of 
the water per lot by "the number of lots to be sold in the development (the absorption 
rate)."7 (R. 21909.) The number of lots to be sold depended upon TA obtaining approval 
from the City for new phases. (R. 22244-45.) Thus, if the trier of fact found that: (a) TA 
failed to complete the public improvements; (b) the City had not waived its rights to 
claim that TA failed to complete the public improvements; and (c) the City should not be 
5
 R. 21864; 24656, pp. 63-65, 71-72. 
6
 Ex. 100, pp. 8, §V.I.A-C. 
7
 TA disclosed the same calculation in response to the trial court's December 8, 
2008 discovery order. (R. 23134-35, 23138-41.) 
6 
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estopped from claiming that TA failed to complete such improvements, then, as a matter 
of law, TA could not recover any of its alleged damages. 
The City relied upon TA's alleged damages calculations and presented its case at 
trial accordingly. Because TA's disclosures established that TA's alleged damages 
depended upon the ability to develop further phases, and because the trial court had 
established that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny 
n 
further phases based upon incomplete improvements," one of the City's primary areas of 
focus during the trial was proving that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to 
complete the improvements and defeating TA's estoppel and waiver defenses. (See, e.g., 
R. 24337, pp. 1447-77; 24340, pp. 2130-44; Photo. Exs. 693, 699, 669, 622.) 
From June 3 to June 19, 2009, a trial was held on those and other issues. (R. 
21746,22315.) A jury was empanelled to resolve the factual issues pertaining to all 
claims, except for the parties' estoppel contentions, which the trial court reserved. (R. 
24267.) 
The night before closing arguments, the trial court held a jury instruction and 
special verdict form conference. (R. 24341, pp. 2665-2726.) One of the jury instructions 
that the City offered set forth TA's judicial admissions from its pleadings9 and some of 
the matters found or resolved by the trial court, including that "[t]he Bond Agreements 
8
 R. 21874,1j 32 (quoting R. at 14351). 
9
 The trial court had previously adopted TA's argument that TA's pleading 
allegations are judicial admissions, even if the allegations were made in a pleading that 
was superseded by a pleading amendment. (R. 10741 n.l.) 
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vest authority in Tooele City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public 
improvements." (R. 22104.) TA objected to the entire instruction, and the trial court 
refused to give it, on the ground that TA did not then stipulate to it. (R. 24341, pp. 2672-
75.) 
The next day, the jury was tasked to fill out a Special Verdict Form ("SVF"), 
which the parties and the trial court prepared the night before, and the morning of, 
closing arguments. (R. 22161-68; 24341, pp. 2726-71; 24342, pp. 2815-28.) A copy of 
the SVF is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As filled out by the jury, the SVF established, 
among other things, that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to complete the 
public improvements and that the City did not waive its rights to claim such non-
completion. (R. 22166-67.) 
Having prevailed on the factual issues necessary to invoke the law of the case that 
"'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases based 
upon incomplete public improvements,'"10 and because TA had not asked the trial court 
to decide its estoppel claims, the City moved for entry of judgment on August 7, 2009. 
(R. 22490-22501.) On September 9, 2009, TA filed an opposition to the City's motion, 
along with a motion asking the trial court to rule that the City was estopped from 
claiming that the public improvements were incomplete. (R. 22566, 22634.) On October 
29, 2009, TA filed its own motion for entry of judgment. (R. 22923-25.) 
R. 21874,132 (quoting R. 14351). 
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On June 16, 2010, the trial court denied TA's estoppel motion, and on August 18, 
2010, it dismissed with prejudice TA's estoppel claims and defenses. (R. 24313-27, 
24621-23.) 
The trial court struggled with the cross-motions for entry of judgment. After the 
two motions were fully briefed, oral argument was held on January 22, 2010. (R. 23008.) 
At the end of the hearing, the trial court expressed difficulty harmonizing the SVF, and it 
requested further briefing. (R. 23008, pp. 133-34.) After the parties had submitted the 
requested briefing, lengthy hearings were held on February 4, 2010 and April 19, 2010. 
(R. 23110, 23295.) Ultimately, the trial court could not reconcile the SVF, and it struck 
the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. (R. 24308-09.) The inconsistency that the trial 
court was unable to reconcile was between the jury's answers to Questions 3 and 8, 
which provided: 
3. Has Tooele Associates proven that Toole City waived its claims and 
its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially 
breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements? 
YES: X NO: 
8. Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to 
claim that Tooele Associates did not complete public improvements in 
Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the Bond 
Agreements? 
YES: NO: X 
(R. 22615-16, 24304.) 
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B. Statement Of Facts. 
1. The City Shared TA's Vision For Overtake And Trusted TA To 
Properly Construct The Required Improvements. 
The City and TA's relationship began in 1995, two years before the Development 
Agreement. In 1995, TA and the City entered into an Annexation Agreement, under 
which the City agreed to annex most of TA's property, which was located in 
unincorporated Tooele County. (Ex. 210.) Most of the benefits that TA argues the City 
received under the Development Agreement - land for a new sewer plant, 636 acre feet 
of water rights, a golf course, park land, etc., were TA's consideration for annexation of 
its property under the Annexation Agreement. (Id.) The additional consideration that TA 
gave under the Development Agreement primarily was TA's promise to develop a 
community that exceeded the quality of development elsewhere in the City - a different 
kind of development that was master planned with enhanced amenities and public 
improvements, a mix of lot sizes and housing styles that adhered to architectural and 
landscape standards, a championship golf course irrigated with recycled water, public 
schools wisely located, and many parks. (E.g., Ex. 100, §§ III.D, F; V.2.A.; VI.2.D; 
VII.2.B.; X.2.A., B.; XI.2.A., B.; 24333, pp. 176-82.) 
After the City adopted TA's vision for Overlake, the parties seemed to work 
together. From 1996 until 2001, TA developed several subdivision phases, including 
Phases 1A, IB, 1C, ID, IE, 1G, and 1J. (Exs. 192-199, 276, 301-02.) 
TA's obligation to construct public improvements was governed by two Bond 
Agreements, one in 1996 for Phases 1A and IB and one in 2001 for Phase U, and four 
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amendments to the 1996 Bond Agreement to cover Phases 1C, ID, IE, and 1G. (Exs. 
220, 267, 268, 282, 293, 449.) The Bond Agreements required that TA's construction of 
public improvements conform to the engineering plans and specifications, which TA's 
own engineers prepared; they imposed a time limit for all public improvement 
construction - one year for Phase 1J and two years for all other phases; and they 
precluded any change to the plans unless evidenced by a written change order. (R. 
22246; 22268; Exs. 220 § 6, 273, 302B, 303-06, 425, 449 § 6; 24334, pp. 600-01; 24335, 
pp. 763, 765-66; 24339, pp. 1941-43.) There was no written change order relieving TA 
from completing any of the numerous incomplete public improvements identified at trial. 
(R. 24340, pp. 2160-61, 2168, 2172-73, 2179, 2183, 2192-94.) The jury was specifically 
instructed that City employees lacked authority to alter, or relieve TA from, the 
requirements of the Bond Agreements. (R. 22266.) 
For all phases except Phase 1 J, TA's construction obligations were ultimately 
secured by a deed of trust, recorded on August 23, 2001. (Exs. 1023, 355 at TC067015.) 
TA had persuaded the City to reconvey an earlier trust deed in exchange for the August 
23, 2001 deed, but TA neglected to mention that the August 23, 2001 trust deed was 
junior to two other trust deeds, securing $4,900,000 of debt. (R. Ex. 355 at TC067014-
15; 24339, pp. 1927-29.) The City was unaware of the situation until 2007, when it 
commissioned a title report to check TA's assertion that the City was "fully secured." (R. 
Ex. 355 at TC066885, TC066973.) After the City raised the concern to TA, TA did 
nothing to collateralize its public improvement obligations, such as try to subordinate the 
senior deeds or provide a substitute bond, and TA's joint venture partner, Perry Homes, 
11 
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Inc., refused to do so as well.11 (Exs. 355 at 5, 356 at 2-3; 24338, p. 1643; 24339, pp. 
2006-07.) The senior encumbrances, together with the City's preference to try to get TA 
to finish the improvements itself, is why the City did not initiate foreclosure proceedings. 
(R. 24339, pp. 1944-45.) TA's argument in this appeal that the first and second position 
deeds "were implied to have been paid down or off is untrue and is not supported by the 
record pages TA cites. (TA's Brf. 17 n.19 (citing R. 24339, pp. 1965-73).) 
Because TA appeared to be working to complete its public improvements and had 
declared no contrary intent, the City approved additional subdivision plats and issued 
building and occupancy permits in phases before all improvements were completed, 
which allowed TA to sell lots and generate revenue. (R. 24339, pp. 1944-45, 2007-08; 
Ex. 323.) And because the City had issued building and occupancy permits, it had to 
make municipal services available for the safety and well-being of those going to and 
from the building sites and, ultimately, the occupants of the permitted homes. No one 
believed that the approval of additional plats, issuance of building and occupancy 
permits, and the provision of municipal services that necessarily followed the issuance of 
such permits indicated that TA's public improvements were complete or somehow 
relieved TA from properly finishing them. (R. 24333, p. 288; 24335, pp. 775-76, 800-01; 
24339, pp. 2025-26; 24340, pp. 2298-99.) 
11
 A Perry Homes, Inc. witness admitted that Perry Homes never offered to replace 
TA's worthless security. (R. 24341, p. 2589.) He went on to say that he "didn't know 
the City really had that big of an issue with the bond until this trial," but that testimony 
was belied by his own acknowledgement, during a November 14, 2007 Planning 
Commission meeting, that"[t]he City has responded that the bonds are insufficient." 
(Ex. 356 at 3.) 
12 
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2. Overwhelmed By Growth Throughout Tooele City, The City Relied 
On TA's Engineers At Forsgren To Conduct The Public 
Improvement Inspections In Overlake. 
Perhaps most illustrative of how the City perceived its relationship with TA was 
the City's reliance on TA's engineers with Forsgren Associates, Inc. ("Forsgren") to 
ensure that the public improvements were properly completed in Phases 1A, IB, and 1C. 
In the latter half of the 1990's, the City was inundated with development, and it lacked 
the resources to conduct public improvement inspections in Overlake. (R. 24339, pp. 
2036-40; Ex. 113.) For that reason, the City relied on the inspections that Forsgren was 
conducting for TA during the construction of Phases 1A, IB, and 1C. (Ex. 113; 24333, 
pp. 245, 261, 280; 24339, pp. 2036-37.) City inspectors only occasionally visited 
Overlake construction sites, and only to "go over what they had completed," not to ensure 
that all required public improvements were finished.12 (R. 24339, pp. 2023-25, 2036-37; 
24340, pp. 2201-03; 24341, pp. 2600, 2605.) 
Forsgren was undoubtedly acting for and on behalf of TA during these 
inspections. (Exs. 113, 248; 24337, pp. 1514-15; 24335, pp. 762-63; 24337, pp. 1514-15; 
24339, pp. 2019, 2044-45; 24340, pp. 2146-50.) Forsgren's letter that "memorialized" 
and "confirmed]" the inspection arrangement provided: "This letter is to inform the City 
that Forsgren Associates has been retained by Tooele Associates to provide construction 
inspection services for all Overlake projects." (R. 24341, pp. 2646-47; Ex. 113 
i *y 
TA was told that if an inspector misses something, TA still has to install it. (R. 
24339, p. 2025.) In any event, the jury was instructed that City inspectors lacked 
authority to alter the requirements of the Bond Agreements. (R. 22266.) 
#278521 vl sic 
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(emphasis added).) Forsgren's contract for inspections was with TA, not the City, and 
TApaid for them. (R. 24335, pp. 762-63; 24337, pp. 1487, 1514-15.) 
The City's reliance on Forsgren was the sole reason that the former City 
Engineer/Public Works Director, Gerald Webster, agreed on January 13, 1998, to "accept 
on behalf of Tooele City the wet utilities, roadway surface and curb and gutter in Phase 
IB Overlake Development."13 (R. Ex. 123; 24339, pp. 2017-18.) Reliance on Forsgren 
also was the reason for the statements regarding Phases IB and 1C in City Assistant 
Attorney Curt Morris' letters and the bond amount reductions.14 (R. 24339, p. 1944; 
24341, pp. 2451-53.) 
3. TA Suffered Financial Difficulties, Which Caused TA To, Initially, 
Delay Completing Improvements. 
Not long into the project, TA ran into financial difficulties so acute that they 
became paralyzing in July, 2001, causing TA to halt development. (R. 24333, pp. 376-
78, 479, 500-01, 538-39; 24335, pp. 780-81; 24337, pp. 1393-1402; 24339, pp. 2057, 
2059-60; 24341, pp. 2490-95; Exs. 417, 424, 429, 452, 601, 804, 858.) As a result, TA 
delayed the completion of improvements that the City did not require TA to finish prior 
TA asserts that Mr. Webster's signature on the letter means that Mr. Webster 
"certified" that the Phase IB improvements were complete. TA's assertion is untrue. 
The only certification was provided by Forsgren. (R. 24339, pp. 2017-18, 2036-37; Ex. 
123.) In any event, the jury was instructed that only the City Council had the authority to 
do what Mr. Webster purported to - accept public improvements - and that Mr. Webster 
lacked authority to alter, or relieve TA from, TA's Bond Agreement requirements. (R. 
22224; 22246; 22263; 22266.) 
14
 Under City ordinances, bond reductions in no way preclude the City from 
requiring completion of improvements later found to be incomplete. (R. 24333, pp. 264-
65; 24339, pp. 1944; 24341, pp. 2452-54.) Reducing the bond amount was simply an 
accommodation to TA to free up a portion of its collateral. (R. 24340, pp. 2300-01.) 
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to the issuance of building and occupancy permits. (R. 24335, pp. 775-76, 800-01; 
24339, pp. 2025-26.) For example, TA decided to "[d]efer to Spring," 1998 the 400 West 
improvements that TA was required to complete in Phase IB. (R. Ex. 238; 24334, pp. 
604-06.) In a February 16, 1998 document (two months after Forsgren certified that the 
Phase IB improvements were complete), TA listed $232,065 in "400 West Phase IB 
Items to Complete," as well as another $209,730 in other "IB items to Complete." (Ex. 
249; 24334, pp. 608-09.) 
The time TA planned to complete 400 West per the approved construction plans, 
however, continually slipped, until TA decided not to complete 400 West at all. In 
January, 1999, TA listed as "1999 Activities" "8. Pave 400 W from 2000 N to 
DiMaggio" - the segment of 400 West in Phase IB - and "9. Landscape 400 W from 
2000N to South end of 1C." (Ex. 273.) TA did not finish 400 West in 1999, so, in 
January, 2001, TA asked his partners for $325,000 for "Infrastructure 400 West" to be 
done in 2002. (Ex. 438 at Ex. A.) TA's partners never provided funds to finish 400 
West, and it was never completed. (R. 24339, pp. 2069-70; 24340 pp. 2140-43, 2151-52, 
2162.) 
TA had not finished other streets in Overlake to the extent required by the 
approved construction plans either, and it left other required improvements incomplete as 
well.15 In Phases ID and IE, TA left the eastern one-third of Berra Blvd. incomplete. 
15
 In Phase IE, TA failed to enlarge the temporary storm water detention facility, 
so that it now has only half of its required capacity. (R. 24340, p. 2193.) In Phase 1G, 
TA failed to construct sidewalk around multi-family lots. (Id. p. 2179-81.) TA also 
failed to install required landscaping, street lights, reflector signs, ADA comer ramps, 
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(R. 24340, pp. 2168-69, 2173.) The Phase ID and IE construction plans clearly required 
full completion, and the City denied TA's request during Phase ID construction to only 
partially build Berra Blvd. (Id pp. 2170-72, 2177-78; Exs. 277-78, 281.) The City 
repeatedly reminded TA of the requirement to finish Berra Blvd. in "real time"16 during 
TA's Phase ID and IE construction. (Exs. 431, 439; 24340, pp. 2177-78; 24339, pp. 
2055, 2066-69; Ex. 405.) 
With respect to Phase 1 J, TA promised to finish the south side of 2000 North 
when the hospital to the north finished its side of 2000 North. (R. 24337, p. 320; Exs. 
415-46.) The hospital completed its side of 2000 North in 2004, but TA refused to 
complete the south side.17 (R. 24340, pp. 2187-90.) 
4. TA Assured The City That It Would Finish The Improvements, 
Including 400 West Berra Blvd., And 2000 North, As Part Of 
Phases IB, 1C, ID, I K A n d l J . 
Prior to Phase ID construction, the City stopped relying on Forsgren for 
inspections because the City discovered that Forsgren was allowing TA and its 
street monuments, decorative bollards, street signs, storm drain pipe, storm drain boxes, 
storm drain box tops, sewer/storm drain collars, concrete collars around manholes and 
valves, and hydrants, and TA left valves buried in asphalt so that they could only be 
found with a metal detector. (Id pp. 2183, 2193-94; 24337, pp. 1459-60, 1464; Exs. 685, 
308-13.) 
16
 TA's Brf. 49. 
17
 TA asserts that the City obtained State of Utah road funds by claiming it owned 
the roads, which, TA argues, could only happen if the City accepted them as complete. 
(TA's Brf. at 50.) Although the City did obtain road funds, eligibility for such funds was 
not dependent upon road improvements being completed or accepted. (R. 24335, pp. 
796-97; 24339, pp. 1945-47; Ex. 1027; 24340, pp. 2302-03.) In any event, the trial court 
instructed the jury that City employees, including those who prepared and signed the road 
fund requests, lacked authority to alter TA's Bond Agreement requirements. (R. 22266.) 
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contractors to cut comers. (R. 24340, pp. 2148-50; Ex. 248.) The City realized that TA's 
public improvements in Phases 1A, IB, and 1C were not complete, as Forsgren had 
certified. (R. 24340, pp. 2013-14, 2035; Ex. 447.) The evidence overwhelmingly proved 
that the City made TA aware of the issue, long before this lawsuit. 
TA's former Vice President testified that, during her employment with TA 
between 1998 and 2001, City officials indicated to TA that 400 West in Phases IB and 
1C and Berra Blvd. in Phases ID and IE should be completed to full width. (R. 24339, 
pp. 2055, 2066.) During a May 9, 2000 "Summit Meeting" between the City and TA, 
one of the "specific problems" that the City identified was "[fjinish both sides of 
ROAD," which was a reference to Berra Blvd. (Id. 2067-69; Ex. 405.) City witnesses 
likewise testified that the City had raised the non-completion of 400 West and other roads 
by May, 2000. (R. 24340, pp. 2170-72, 2177-79; 24339, pp. 2013-14, 2035; Ex. 471.) 
In response to the City's complaints about TA's public improvements, TA 
acknowledged the requirement to complete the roads as part of the existing phases (not 
with future phases), and it agreed to finish the improvements "one phase at a time." (R. 
24340, pp. 2205-07, 2283-85; 24341, pp. 2456-57; 24339, pp. 2018-19; Exs. 456, 471.) 
Between May, 2000, and June 2002, TA appeared to follow through on its 
promises to complete its improvement construction "one phase at a time." (Ex. 456.) TA 
completed Phase 1A, reported such completion during a September 18, 2001 meeting 
with the City, and about two weeks later, the City accepted the Phase 1A public 
improvements. (R. Exs. 117-18; 24340, pp. 2205-07.) During the September 18, 2001 
meeting, TA's managing general partner Drew Hall said that "they are going to work on 
17 
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IE next." (R. Ex. 456.) On June 6, 2002, TA wrote to the City about scheduling final 
inspections for Phases IB, 1C, ID, and IE. (R. Ex. 475; 24334, pp. 614-15.) Based on 
TA's assurances and reported progress, the City approved the subdivision plat for Phase 
U. (R. 24339, pp. 2007-08; Exs. 301, 323.) 
5. Just Before Filing This Lawsuit Against The City, TA Declared That 
It Was "At War" With The City, And TA Stopped Working On 
Public Improvements And Started Working On Excuses For Not 
Completing Them. 
In June, 2002, TA stopped all efforts to compete public improvements. Shortly 
after sending the June 6, 2002 letter regarding final inspections for Phases IB through IE, 
TA's Drew Hall met with the City Engineer, Paul Hansen, and told him that TA was "at 
war" with the City. (R. 24340, pp. 2207-08; 24339, pp. 2007-08.) 
Instead of working on public improvements, TA began to contrive excuses for 
why it should not have to complete them. All of TA's excuses lack credibility. 
According to TA's former Vice President, the "real reason Tooele Associates didn't 
finish those streets" was "[tjhere was no money to build the roads." (R. 24339, pp. 2069-
70.) 
6. Financial Troubles Caused TA To Not Only Cut Corners On Public 
Improvements, But Withhold Payment For Irrigation Water. 
Under the Development Agreement, TA was required to pay for water used to 
irrigate the Overlake golf course. (Ex. 105, § 8.) TA failed and refused to pay amounts 
due since December 18, 2006, despite its receipt of the City's invoices and monthly 
statements. (R. 24340, pp. 2360-62; Ex. 800.) TA insisted that it did not need to pay for 
the water it used because the invoices lacked meter readings, which, TA argued, was 
18 
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required under the Development Agreement. (R. 24333, pp. 212-13, 219-21.) In all the 
evidence regarding the water charges, TA presented nothing that indicated or inferred 
that the City waived its claim that TA materially breached the Development Agreement 
by failing to pay amounts owed for golf course irrigation water. (Id pp. 206-21; R. 
24339, p. 2029; 24340, pp. 2353-74; Exs. 100, 102,104, 541-42, 545-56, 661, 687.) TA 
never even claimed such waiver. (R. 21845-54.) 
In the SVF, the jury found that the City proved that TA materially breached the 
Development Agreement "[b]y failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the 
Overlake Golf Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment #4 to the Development 
Agreement." (R. 22164-65, Quest. 2.e.) In response to the next question, however, the 
jury inexplicably found that the City waived such breach. (R. 22165.) 
7. TA's Development Failed Because Of TA's Financial Distress. 
According to TA's correspondence with property tax authorities and its limited 
partners, TA's development failed because of its financial distress, not because of 
anything the City did. (R. 24334, pp. 480-85, 487-91, 500-06; Exs. 424, 438, 441, 452-
53, 455, 462-63, 487, 496, 600-01.) TA was severely undercapitalized for the 
development it undertook, and its overhead and debt service expenses prevented TA from 
ever realizing any profits. (R. 24341, pp. 2469-72, 2477-78.) The only capital 
contribution ever made by TA's partners was for less than half the purchase price of the 
property in 1994. (Exs. 487, 804.) Every other dollar TA spent was borrowed from 
lenders. (Ex. 804.) As a result of TA's debt load, its interest expense was 1,400% 
greater than what TA projected. (Ex. 857.) TA's overhead expenses also exceeded 
19 
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budget, by 1,700%. (Id.) On top of its crushing debt load and overhead expenses, the 
residential real estate market suffered a serious, three-year decline beginning in 2000. 
(Ex. 1003.) TA quickly found itself in financial crisis, and in July, 2001, TA's partners 
halted the project. (Ex. 452.) Thereafter, TA sold off all but 55 acres of its remaining, 
undeveloped property to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, a shell holding company with 
only $4,070 in total assets. (R. 24334, pp. 565-66, 571-72, 576-77; Ex. 634.) 
8. Lacking Property To Develop, TA Shifted Its Focus To Blaming The 
City For The Failure Of Its Development Project. 
After TA had practically no more property to develop, TA shifted its focus to 
blaming the City for the failures caused by TA's financial distress and the poor economy. 
A prime example is TA's claim that the City adopted a "slow-growth" policy by 
proposing an ordinance limiting its culinary water commitments to Overlake. (TA's Brf. 
12.) What actually happened is that the City reaffirmed its culinary water commitment to 
TA, but required other developers to provide water rights for their developments, an 
action which, TA boasted, gave TA "close to a monopoly for residential growth in Tooele 
City." (Ex. 250 at 2.) 
Another example is TA's assertion that the City was motivated to deprive TA of 
its Development Agreement benefits because the City lacked culinary water for Overlake. 
(TA's Brf. 12-13.) According to the testimony of TA's own water rights expert, 
however, the City had been "very active" in acquiring water rights in order to 
accommodate growth. (R. 24336, p. 1059.) TA presented no evidence that the City was 
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in any way concerned about providing culinary water for Overlake. (R. 24339, pp. 1843-
44.) 
Finally, TA alleges a list of grievances, such as tardiness, to try to prove that TA 
faced "conflict and antagonism from the City" in all of its dealings with the City after 
1999. (TA's Brf. 13.) Actually, the City made extraordinary accommodations for TA 
that other developers did not enjoy. (R. 24339, pp. 1910-12, 1927-29, 1944, 2036-37; 
24340, pp. 2136-38, 2243-44, 2298-99, 2300-02; 24340, pp. 2357, 2361; Exs. 101, 105, 
113, 405, 456, 483.) TA's portrayal of conflict and antagonism is belied by TA's May, 
2000 public assertion that "Tooele is now on the leading edge, and many municipalities 
are looking to us as an example of what to do right." (Ex. 407; R. 24334, pp. 526-27.) 
The public improvement requirements imposed on TA were not "ever-changing"; 
they were those in TA's own construction plans, and most of the construction 
deficiencies that the City raised were also identified by TA's own engineers at Forsgren. 
(R. 24334, pp. 528-901, 607-08, 611-14; 24337, pp. 1424, 1449-50, 1455-61, 1464, 
1466-71; 24340, pp. 2138-43, 2151-52, 2162-64, 2168-70, 2173-74, 2179-86, 2192-94; 
Exs. 157, 281, 447, 611, 624, 685.) TA's own engineer witnesses testified that the City 
cannot be expected to generate a "complete 'punch list'" when the construction has yet to 
be completed. (R. 24337, pp. 1473-75, 1522.) With respect to alleged "disparate 
treatment," there was no development project in the City with as egregious public 
improvement deficiencies as Overlake,18 and the City's request for master planning 
18
 R. 24340, pp. 2215-17. 
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documents, which was first made in 1996, was commensurate with the impact of 
Overlake and its 7,500 anticipated lots.19 (R. 24340, pp. 2234-35.) TA bemoans the 
City's processing time for requests, but the amount of time taken was attributable in most 
cases to delays on TA's side. (R. at 24339, pp. 1921-24; 24340, pp. 2235-36; Ex. 355 at 
TC066890-94.) The fact of the matter is that TA's financial distress and the sour 
economy caused TA's partners to decide to halt further development in July, 2001, and 
from then on, TA spent its time posturing rather than developing. (Ex. 452.) 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
The trial court should have entered judgment in the City's favor. The SVF can be 
interpreted as follows: 
(1) The City breached the Development Agreement in certain respects, 
but not by refusing to accept as complete TA's public improvements and by 
creating "arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public improvements" 
(Quest. 1); 
(2) TA also materially breached the Development Agreement, but the 
City waived its material breach defenses to TA's Development Agreement 
claims (Quest. 2 and 3); 
(3) The jury proceeded to calculate TA's alleged damages (Quest. 4 and 
5); 
(4) TA breached the Bond Agreements, by not completing public 
improvements, and the Development Agreement, by not paying for 
secondary water used for golf course irrigation, and such breaches were 
The City requested only the master planning documents that TA's engineers at 
Forsgren had already prepared in 1998, after Forsgren convinced TA that "[t]he 
importance of undertaking these planning efforts right now is to make sure that what is 
installed now will accommodate future development without having to tear up streets and 
install additional facilities." (Ex. 665 at 3, 5.) The City shared these concerns and simply 
wanted to review the master planning documents already prepared to assure itself that 
future development would not require streets to be torn up. (R. 24340, pp. 2231-35.). 
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substantial enough to cause $1.82 million in damages ($1.75 million on the 
public improvement deficiencies, and $70,000 in secondary water taken 
without payment) (Quest. 6-7, 9-13); and 
(5) The City did not waive its rights to claim that TA failed to complete 
the public improvements as required by the Bond Agreements. (Quest. 8.) 
(R. 22162-67.) The trial court should have applied to these findings, and its dismissal of 
TA's estoppel claims, the law of the case that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest 
authority in the City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public 
improvements.'" (R. 21874 ^  32 (quoting R. 14351).) Because of all TA's alleged 
damages depended on the ability to develop additional lots in further phases, there is no 
legal basis for TA's recovery of any damages. 
The trial court was right to reject TA's interpretation of the SVF. TA's 
interpretation is untenable. It conflicts with the plain language of the SVF and 
controlling Utah law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) does not support it. In the alternative, if 
this Court is inclined to adopt TA's interpretation of the SVF, other grounds exist to 
affirm the trial court's decision striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial. 
Specifically, the jury's findings that the City waived TA's failure to pay for golf course 
irrigation water lacks evidentiary support; the jury's finding that the City breached the 
Development Agreement by refusing to consent to assignments lacks evidentiary support 
and is contrary to law; and the jury's findings of TA's alleged damages are excessive. 
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VIII. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE CITY. 
Under Utah law, the trial court is required to apply the law to the facts found in a 
special verdict form and enter judgment accordingly. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(a); Dishinger 
v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, ffi[ 16-17,47 P.3d 76; Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 
470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970). 
In this case, the City was entitled to judgment in its favor, on the following 
grounds: (a) the law of the case that '"the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in 
the City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements'"20; (b) the 
jury's finding that TA "breached the Bond Agreements and Bond Agreement 
amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake"21; (c) the jury's 
finding that TA failed to prove that the City waived its rights to claim that TA did not 
complete the public improvements ; (d) the trial court's rejection of TA's estoppel 
claims23; and (e) TA's damages statement in the Pre-Trial Order, which made clear that 
TA's alleged damages depended upon the ability to develop additional lots in further 
phases.24 (R. 21909.) 
20
 R. 21874132 (quoting R. 14351). 
21
 R. 22166 Quest. 6. 
22
 Id Quest. 8. 
23
 R. 24313-27, 24621-23. 
24
 As TA itself argued to the trial court, 
24 
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The trial court refused to enter judgment because it found the jury's answers to 
SVF Questions 3 and 8 to be irreconcilably inconsistent. Those answers are reconcilable, 
and the reasons the trial court concluded otherwise are incorrect. 
h By Their Plain Terms, The Answers to Questions 3 And 8 Are 
Consistent. 
As TA concedes, "[t]he first step in the harmonization analysis is to consider the 
plain language of the Verdict." (TA's Brf. 21.) Taken together, the plain language of 
Questions 3 and 8 and the answers thereto mean that the City waived its claims and 
defenses under either the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements, but not both. 
The Court may adopt this interpretation on any one of the five, following grounds. 
a. Question 3's Use Of The Term "And/Or" And The Answer 
To Question 8 Indicate That The City Did Not Waive Its 
Claims Under Both The Development Agreement And The 
Bond Agreements. 
Question 3 asked whether the City waived certain claims under "the Development 
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements," whereas Question 8 asked whether the City 
waived certain claims under "the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements." 
(Emphasis added.) The disjunctive or conjunctive nature of a jury question is important. 
"The pretrial order controls the issues of the case where it is made without 
objection and no motion is made to change it, unless it is modified at the 
trial to prevent manifest injustice." Citizens Cas. Co. of New York v. 
Hackett, 410 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah 1966). "[T]he pretrial order is treated as 
superseding the pleadings and establishing the issues to be considered at 
trial." . . . Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1522. Accordingly, 
"claims, issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in the pretrial 
order are waived even if they appeared in the complaint.. . ." Wilson v. 
Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002). 
R. 23255. 
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Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1979); Perry v. 
Stewart Title Co.. 756 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, it can be used to 
readily harmonize the answers to Questions 3 and 8. 
Unlike the word "and," which "is most often considered to create a conjunctive 
condition/9 the expression "and/of is "used as a function word to indicate that words 
are to be taken together or individually[; e.g.,] men and/or women means men and 
women or men or women." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged 80 (1986) (first emphasis added).26 
Because the jury could have understood the term "and/or" to mean "or/5 there is 
no conflict between the answers to Questions 3 and 8. Although Question 8 asked 
whether the City waived certain of its claims under "the Development Agreement and the 
Bond Agreements," to which the jury answered "no/' Question 3 may be read to have 
asked whether the City waived certain claims under the Development Agreement or the 
Bond Agreements. Interpreting the term "and/or" to mean "or" reconciles the conflict 
between Questions 3 and 8, so that is the interpretation that must be adopted. Wright v. 
25
 Parrv. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, IT 8. 117 P.3d 1079. 
26
 See also Bank Building & Equip. Corp. v. Georgia State Bank, 209 S.E.2d 82, 
84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (citations omitted) ("'[T]he expression "and or" is equivocal and 
is neither positively conjunctive nor positively disjunctive....'"); State Ins. Fund v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 205 P.2d 245, 246-47 (Utah 1949) (holding that an order 
requiring "'Merchants Police and/or Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc.'" to pay an 
injured employee's expenses did not indicate which entity must pay); Putnam v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 14 P.2d 973, 983 (Utah 1932) ('"When [the term "and/or" is] used in 
a contract, the intention is that the one word or the other may be taken accordingly as the 
one or the other will best effect the purpose of the parties . . . ." (Citation omitted)). 
#278521 vl sic 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2510 (1995) ("It is the duty of the district 
court to attempt to harmonize the jury's answers, if at all possible under a fair reading of 
the responses."). Under this interpretation, the jury's response to Question 3 means that 
the City waived certain of its claims under either the Development Agreement or the 
Bond Agreements, but not both. 
That leads to the question: which claims were waived, Development Agreement 
claims or Bond Agreement claims? Resolution of this question is unimportant, as the 
outcome is the same either way. If the City only waived certain Development Agreement 
claims, then TA's Bond Agreement breaches would allow the City to deny further 
phases, and TA would not be entitled to recover any alleged damages. If the City only 
waived the Bond Agreement claims, then TA still would not be able to recover any of 
those alleged damages because TA's material Development Agreement breaches, as 
found by the jury in response to Question 2, excuse the City's liability to TA under the 
Development Agreement. 
As demonstrated below, however, important portions of Question 3 indicate that 
the jury intended to find that the City waived only material breach claims under the 
Development Agreement. Question 3 was limited to the inquiry of whether the City 
waived the claims "as stated in Question 2," and Question 2 was devoted solely to 
Development Agreement claims. In addition, Question 3 was limited to the inquiry of 
whether the City waived "material[]" breach claims, and the City's "material[]" breach 
claims set forth in the SVF were limited to claims under the Development Agreement. 
27 
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Furthermore, all the jury instructions dealing with materiality of breaches identified only 
the Development Agreement, not the Bond Agreements. (R. 22204, 22265.) Thus, all 
indications are that the jury intended to find that the City waived claims for material 
breach of the Development Agreement and not claims for breach of the Bond 
Agreements. 
b. Question 3 Was Limited By The Phrase "as stated in 
Question 2." 
Question 3 asked, "Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its 
claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially 
breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?" (Emphasis added.) 
The claims and defenses stated in Question 2 were confined to claims and defenses under 
the Development Agreement. Specifically, Question 2 asked, "Has Tooele City proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates materially breached the 
Development Agreement?" (Emphasis added.) Similarly, sub-parts a.-f. of Question 2 
dealt with the City's individual material breach allegations, all of which were expressly 
predicated on specific provisions of "the Development Agreement." (Emphasis added.) 
Question 2 made absolutely no mention of Bond Agreements, let alone the City's Bond 
Agreement right to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements. 
Because Question 3 was limited by the phrase "as stated in Question 2"; because 
Question 2 had nothing to do with the Bond Agreements; and because Question 3's use 
of the term "and/or" means that the jury's answer to Question 3 does not necessarily 
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mean anything about the Bond Agreements, the jury's "yes" answer to Question 3 had no 
effect on the City's ability to invoke the Bond Agreements. 
TA tries to explain away the phrase "as stated in Question 2" by arguing that 
either Question 2 referenced "the actual actions described in the subparts to Question 2," 
rather than ways in which TA allegedly breached the Development Agreement, or the 
references in Question 2 to "the Development Agreement" encompassed both the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements. (TA's Brf. 32-33.) TA's argument 
is a serious distortion of the SVF. A "plain language" harmonization analysis does not 
involve the subtraction or addition of language. Moszer v. Witt, 622 N.W.2d 223, ^ 9, 
19 (N.D. 2001); Olson v. Alexandria Indep. School Dist. #206, 680 N.W.2d 583, 587 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
Question 2 plainly asks whether TA materially breached "the Development 
Agreement"; it asks "how [TA] breached the Development Agreement"; and each and 
every one of its sub-questions references one or more specific sections of "the 
Development Agreement." It does not "go[] far beyond the Development Agreement in 
addressing the various wrongful actions o f TA,27 and the Bond Agreements are nowhere 
mentioned. In fact, during oral argument on how to reconcile the SVF, TA repeatedly 
argued that Question 2 dealt only with the Development Agreement: "Question 2 doesn't 
have any discussion of the Bond Agreements. Question 2 only discusses the 
TA's Brf. 32. 
29 
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Development Agreement. Duh." (R. 23110, pp. 24, 27.) TA's argument impermissibly 
adds and subtracts words from Question 2. 
c. Question 3 Was Limited By The Term "Materially" 
Another important qualification in Question 3 is the term "materially55: "Has 
Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, as stated in 
Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development Agreement 
and/or Bond Agreements." (Emphasis added.) The importance of the word "materially" 
in Question 3 is demonstrated by a comparison of the responses to Question 3 and 
Question 8. Question 8 made a similar, more detailed inquiry, except it omitted the word 
"materially": "Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to claim 
that Tooele Associates did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements?" Although the jury answered "yes" 
to Question 3, it answered "no" to Question 8, indicating that the jury found that the City 
waived certain "material[]" breach claims, but not breach claims. 
The "material breach" concept was important in the context of Section I of the 
Special Verdict Form, but not in the context of Section II. During oral argument on how 
to harmonize the SVF, TA conceded that "the word 'material' . . . relates to the 
Development Agreement and not the Bond Agreement." (R. 23008, p. 41.) As explained 
to the jury, the "materiality" of TA's Development Agreement breaches would excuse the 
City's further performance of, and effectively terminate, the Development Agreement. 
(R. 22265.) But the City never sought to excuse its performance of, or terminate, the 
Bond Agreements. On the contrary, throughout this case the City invoked the Bond 
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Agreement provisions that "'vest authority in the City to deny further phases based upon 
incomplete public improvements.'" (R. 21874, Tf 32 (quoting R. 14351).) Furthermore, 
TA did not try to excuse its performance under the Bond Agreements by claiming that the 
City breached those agreements. Because no party claimed that its performance under 
the Bond Agreements was excused by the other side's non-performance, the "materiality" 
of Bond Agreement breaches was irrelevant. 
Contrary to TA's argument, the separate doctrine of "substantial performance" 
also had no bearing on the City's Bond Agreement claims, unlike the parties' 
Development Agreement claims. Under the Development Agreement, TA's "substantial 
performance" was an issue because TA could qualify for a ten-year extension of the 
Development Agreement "if the terms of the [that] Agreement have been substantially 
complied with." (Ex. 100. § XXIII (emphasis added).) In contrast, the Bond Agreement 
provisions that vest authority in the City to deny further phases are triggered by any non-
performance, not just "substantial" or "material" non-performance. (R. Ex. 220 §§1.3 
and 18, Ex. 449 §§1.3 and 18). Under Utah law, the doctrine of substantial performance 
is inapplicable to a contract that does not consider "substantial performance" to be 
sufficient.28 Therefore, under controlling Utah law, the "substantial" or "non-substantial" 
nature of TA's Bond Agreement breaches is irrelevant. 
28
 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Utah 1993) 
("The contract between the parties does not consider substantial completion; rather, it 
considers final completion," so "the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply to 
the facts of this case."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. d (1981) ("If, 
therefore, the agreement makes full performance a condition, substantial performance is 
not sufficient."). 
31 
#278521 vl sic Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The irrelevance of the "material" or "substantial" nature of TA's Bond Agreement 
breaches is supported by the jury instructions on the "material breach" and "substantial 
performance" concepts. All of those instructions related only to the Development 
Agreement, not the Bond Agreements. (R. 22204, 22209, 22265.) It is presumed that 
juries do not base their findings on legal concepts outside the jury instructions. Los 
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986); De Feliciano v. De Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 451 
(1st Cir. 1989); Olson v. City of Austin, 386 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); 
Delzer v. United Bank of Bismark, 527 N.W.2d 650, 655-56 (N.D. 1995). Because the 
jury instructions limited the concepts of "material breach" and "substantial performance" 
to the Development Agreement, those concepts have no bearing on TA's Bond 
Agreement breaches. 
If, as TA argues, it could have satisfied the Bond Agreements with "substantial" 
rather than full performance, or if a "material breach" of the Bond Agreements was 
necessary for the City to invoke its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases, TA 
waived those arguments. "If. . . the court omits [from the special verdict form] any issue 
of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by 
jury of the issue so omitted...." Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). TA did not ask for any SVF 
question as to whether TA's Bond Agreement breaches were "substantial" or "material." 
In the SVF section that deals with "The City's Claims"—Section II—the jury was asked 
to determine whether TA "breached the Bond Agreement and Bond Agreement 
amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overtake," and nowhere was 
the jury asked to determine whether the breaches were "material," "non-material," 
32 
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"substantial" or "non-substantial." Thus, the nature of TA's Bond Agreement breaches is 
irrelevant because the Bond Agreements "do[] not consider substantial completion," 
and because TA never asked for a jury determination of whether its Bond Agreement 
breaches were "substantial" or "material." -
d. If Question 3 Cannot Be Reconciled With Question 8, It Must 
Give Way To Question 8. 
One of the available interpretive guides is the rule that "general findings in the 
nature of conclusions, if contradicted by special or detailed findings, cannot prevail, but 
are controlled by and must yield to such detailed findings of ultimate facts." Knape v. 
Livingston Oil Co., 392 P.2d 842, 845 (Kan. 1964); Wright, 787 P.2d at 516 (citing 
Knape with approval and holding that "where . . . two [findings] cannot be reconciled, as 
in this case, the more specific finding must govern the outcome"). Between Questions 3 
and 8, Question 8 is the more detailed and specific finding, as TA conceded. (R. 23110, 
p. 29.) Question 8 deals with just the City's public improvement claims under the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements, whereas Question 3 deals with the 
City's "claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that [TA] materially breached the 
Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements." Thus, Question 8 is more specific 
and, accordingly, Question 8 and the answer thereto are controlling. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 858 P.2d at 1369. 
#278521 vl sic 
33 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
e. Any Inconsistency Between Questions 3 And 8 May Be 
Resolved By Disregarding The Answer To Question 3, Which 
Lacks Evidentiary Support. 
"A judge may dissipate the inconsistency by setting aside one of the conflicting 
verdicts, if the verdict was unsupported by the evidence." American Cas. Co. v. 
Cianciolo, 987 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Orwick v. Belshan, 231 N.W.2d 
90, 94-95 (Minn. 1975). Any fair and reasonable basis on which to reconcile verdicts is 
preferable to a new trial, and one such basis is the court's authority to grant judgment as a 
mater of law notwithstanding the verdict when the verdict lacks evidentiary support. 
American Cas. Co., 987 F.2d at 1305; Orwick, 231 N.W.2d at 94. 
Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 335 P.2d 619, 622 (Utah 1959), supports this 
approach. In that slip and fall action, the jury in a special verdict found plaintiff and 
defendant both negligent; that defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs fall; 
that plaintiffs negligence was not the proximate cause of the fall; and the amount that 
would fairly compensate the plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment in the defendant's 
favor, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing, in part, that the special verdict answers were 
inconsistent, requiring a new trial. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs 
argument on the grounds that "there was no substantial evidence, nor was there any 
evidence to support the [negative] answer to" the question asking whether plaintiffs 
negligence was a proximate cause of his fall. Id 622. Therefore, the Court changed the 
answer to the question, which, when combined with other answers and applied to the old 
law of contributory negligence, required a judgment for defendant. 
«97R<;oi wi d^ 
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In this case, the answer to Question 3 lacks evidentiary support. Question 3 asked 
whether TA proved that the City waived its claims and defenses, "as stated in Question 
2," and the jury answered, "yes." One of the claims and defenses in Question 2 on which 
the jury sided with the City was the City's claim that TA materially breached the 
Development Agreement "[b]y failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the 
Overtake Golf Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment #4 to the Development 
Agreement." There was absolutely no evidence, however, that indicated or inferred that 
the City waived such breach. Accordingly, to resolve any inconsistency between 
Questions 3 and 8, the answer to Question 3 should be changed to "no." 
2. For Incorrect Reasons, The Trial Court Concluded That The 
Answers to Questions 3 And 8 Are Irreconcilably Inconsistent. 
According to the trial court's analysis, the City's interpretation of the SVF was 
"the most persuasive of the arguments by the parties to the Court to harmonize the jury's 
findings in the SVF." (R. 24304.) In other words, the trial court agreed that if any party 
was right in its interpretation of the SVF, it was the City. 
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to adopt the City's interpretation for four 
reasons, all of which were incorrect. First, the trial court misconstrued the answers to 
Questions 1(e), (f), and (g) to mean that the City "actively interfered" with TA's ability to 
complete the public improvements. (Id.) Second, the trial court found that the "practical 
effect" of the City's harmonization of the SVF conflicted with the answers to Question 
1(c) and (i), which indicated that the City breached the Development Agreement by 
refusing to extend the Development Agreement and by refusing to approve additional 
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phases. Third, the trial court suggested that the jury could not distinguish the public 
improvement obligations of the Bond Agreements from those of the Development 
Agreement. Finally, the trial court was troubled with the "legal and financial 
consequences" of the City's interpretation. (R. 24308.) 
a. The Jury Did Not Find That The City "Actively Interfered" 
With TA's Public Improvement Construction. 
The notion that jury findings suggest that the City interfered with TA's ability to 
complete the public improvements in accordance with TA's own plans is flat wrong. A 
jury finding should not be "stretched" to a question "it does not touch" upon. Taylor v. 
Murray, 232 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah 1951). None of the jury's SVF answers indicate that 
the City somehow prevented TA from completing the public improvements to the extent 
shown in TA's own construction plans. 
Indeed, such notion is negated by the jury's SVF answers to Questions 6 and 10 
and Instructions 33 and 44, which the jury must be presumed to have followed. Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981). Under Instruction 33, 
TA would be "excused from performing11 the Bond Agreements ,f[i]f you decide that 
Tooele Associates was willing and able to perform its obligation, but that it could not 
perform that obligation because of something that the other party purposefully did or 
failed to do." (R. 22207 (emphasis added).) The jury's finding in response to Question 6 
that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to complete the public improvements 
indicates either that TA was not "willing" to complete the improvements or the City did 
not "purposefully" prevent TA from completing them. None of the SVF answers 
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suggests a jury determination that both TA was "willing" to complete the improvements 
according to its own construction plans and the City "purposefully" prevented TA from 
completing them. 
A finding that the City actively interfered with TA's public improvement 
construction also conflicts with Instruction 44. Instruction 44 was the mitigation and 
avoidance instruction, which precluded the City from prevailing on any breach of 
contract claim that "it could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation" or 
that it "made worse by its own action or inaction." (R. 22215.) Because the jury must be 
presumed to have followed this instruction, its findings that TA breached the Bond 
Agreements causing the City $1.75 million in damages indicates that the jury rejected the 
notions: (a) that the City "could have avoided [TA's public improvement breaches] 
without undue risk [or] burden"; and (b) that the City "made [TA's public improvement 
non-performance] worse by its own action or inaction." (Id.) In other words, the jury's 
"yes" answer to Question 6 means that the jury rejected the idea that the City actively 
interfered with TA's ability to complete the public improvements to the extent shown in 
TA's own construction plans. If the jury believed that the City actively interfered with 
TA's public improvement work, it simply could not have followed Instructions 33 and 44 
and found that TA breached the Bond Agreements, causing the City $1.75 million in 
damages. 
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b. The Application Of The Law Of The Case, That The Bond 
Agreements Entitle The City To Deny New Phases, Has 
Nothing To Do With Whether The SVF Is Irreconcilably 
Inconsistent. 
The trial court found that the "practical effect" of the City's interpretation of the 
SVF - the City's successful invocation of the law of the case - conflicts with the jury's 
finding that the City breached the Development Agreement by refusing to approve 
applications for the creation of new subdivisions in Overlake and refusing to extend the 
Development Agreement for a second ten-year term. The City's invocation of the law of 
the case, however, has nothing to do with whether the SVF answers themselves are 
inconsistent. As TA concedes, the applicability of the City's Bond Agreement right to 
on 
deny new phases based upon incomplete improvements was not before the jury ; it was a 
matter of law for the trial court to apply upon factual findings of incomplete public 
improvements, non-waiver, and no estoppel. 
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 47 P.3d 76, is squarely on point. 
Dishinger was a landlord/tenant dispute over the amount of rent due during lease renewal 
option periods. The landlord contended it was $30/square foot, and the tenant asserted it 
was $19/square foot, which the tenant paid, and the landlord accepted, for a year. The 
jury's special verdict answers and the undisputed facts satisfied each essential element of 
the tenant's legal theory that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction for rent at the 
$19 rate. Id fflj 20-21, 23, 27. The special verdict, however, went on to determine the 
appropriate rent amount - $25/square foot - and that the landlord was "entitled to 
30TA'sBrf. 19-20. 
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recover" the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730. Id. f 7. Invoking the law of accord 
and satisfaction, the tenant moved for entry of judgment in its favor. The trial court 
denied the tenant's motion and instead entered judgment for the landlord for unlawful 
detainer, awarding $8,730. Id fflf 8-9. 
On appeal, this Court reversed and held that judgment should be entered for the 
tenant. Id, f^ 40. In doing so, this Court rejected the argument, adopted by the trial court 
in this case, that the "practical effect" of the application of the law conflicted with the 
jury's finding of the appropriate rent amount: 
Although it could be argued that the special verdict supports inconsistent 
legal theories (accord and satisfaction and unlawful detainer), the 
inconsistency is not fatal. The jury was instructed to answer all factual 
questions on all legal theories presented in the special verdict. While the 
findings support inconsistent claims, a court is not precluded, under Rule 
49(a), from applying the law to those findings and entering judgment for a 
party on one theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment on 
another inconsistent legal theory. 
Thus, as was the case here, if the special verdict findings support, as a 
matter of law, an accord and satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful 
detainer. 
W, 130 (citations omitted) (citing Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622; Tsudek v. Target Stores, 
Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). In other words, inconsistency 
between the application of legal principles and jury findings is not an inconsistency that 
requires a new trial. Applied to this case, Dishinger means that, if the SVF findings 
support, as a matter of law, the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases, then 
the City could not have been required to approve new phases. 
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The same principle was applied in Judd ex rel Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 
91, % 34, 103 P.3d 135, in which the inconsistency between a jury's damages findings and 
the "practical effect" of a statutory damages cap caused no irreconcilable conflict. The 
principle also was applied in Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397-98 
(Utah 1970), and Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622, where juries in special verdicts concluded 
that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent; and, even though contributory negligence 
was a complete defense, that the defendants were negligent and such negligence caused 
the plaintiffs quantified amounts of damages. No irreconcilable conflict arose from the 
inconsistency between, on the one hand, the findings of the defendants' negligence and 
the plaintiffs' damages and, on the other hand, the "practical effect" of applying the bar 
o 1 
of contributory negligence to the findings that the plaintiffs were negligent. 
The trial court's ruling, as a matter of law, that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, 
vest authority in the City to deny further phases based on incomplete improvements'" is 
akin to the law of accord and satisfaction applied in Dishinger, the statutory damages cap 
31
 See also Davis v. West Cmty. Hosp., 755 F.2d 455 (5m Cir. 1985) (jury finding 
that allegedly libelous statements were true, when applied to law that truth is a complete 
defense to libel, required court to enter judgment for defendants, despite jury findings 
that defendants made libelous statements, with malice, that caused damages and 
warranted punitive damages); Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 305-06, 310 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(jury finding that defendant police officer did not plant evidence, when applied to law of 
qualified immunity, required court to enter judgment for defendant officer, even though 
jury found for plaintiff on her claim for arrest without probable cause); MacBride v. 
Pishvaian, 937 A.2d 233, 238 (Md. 2007) (jury finding of when plaintiffs deceptive 
trade practices claim accrued, when applied to statute of limitations, required judgment 
for defendant, despite jury findings that defendant's were liable for deceptive trade 
practices). 
32
 R. 21874, f 32 (quoting R. 14351). 
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applied in Judd, and the old law of contributory negligence applied in Brigham and 
Milligan. The application of the law in those cases caused no special verdict findings to 
conflict with one another, and nor does the application of the law of the case in the 
present matter. *• 
Thus, the finding that the City breached the Development Agreement by refusing 
to approve new phases or renew the Development Agreement raises no "fatal" 
inconsistency. Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209, ^ 30. "The [jury's] answer to an 
immaterial question or one that can be resolved as a matter of law may be disregarded." 
9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2513 (1995); 
Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 434 F.2d 840, 843 (2d 
Cir. 1970). Otherwise, the jury could effectively nullify the trial court's legal 
determination that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny 
further phases based upon incomplete improvements.'" (R. 21874, f^ 32 (quoting R. 
14351).) 
c. The Jury Could Distinguish Between The Bond Agreements' 
And The Development Agreements' Respective Public 
Improvement Requirements. 
The trial court found it "difficult... to have any confidence that the jury was able 
to distinguish between" the public improvement requirements of the Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreements. (R. 24306.) Distinguishing between related 
contracts, however, was precisely how this Court reconciled special verdict answers in 
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 300 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The same 
is possible in this case. Considering the evidence and the instructions, the jury might 
41 
#278521 vl sic 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have concluded that TA's Bond Agreement duties predated, and were more onerous than, 
TA's Development Agreement duties, and that the City waived the Development 
Agreement's public improvement duties, but not the Bond Agreement's duties. 
The Bond Agreements predated the Development Agreement. The first Bond 
Agreement, which governed Phases 1A, IB, 1C, ID, IE, and 1G, was entered into on 
October 3, 1996 (Ex. 220), whereas the Development Agreement was entered into over a 
year later, on December 18, 1997. (Ex. 100.) 
Moreover, the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements differ in their 
respective public improvement requirements. The Development Agreement required TA 
to complete "sufficient and necessary" right-of-way improvements "in compliance with 
the requirements of the City, in effect at the time of all preliminary and final subdivision 
plats and all site plans." (Ex. 100, §§ III.G., VII.2.E., XVII.) TA tried to prove at trial 
that the "necessary" improvements were installed, they were "sufficient," and the 
"requirements of the City" did not include, for example, full-width completion of streets. 
(TA's Brf. 14 n.13.) TA also presented evidence that, if the City believed that the 
"necessary" improvements were not installed "sufficiently]," the City could have 
prevented the public from using them, and the City's decision not to do so amounted to 
waiver. (R. 24337, pp. 1478-80.) 
By contrast, the Bond Agreements were not satisfied with the construction of 
merely "necessary" or "sufficient" improvements. Unlike the Development Agreement, 
the Bond Agreements unambiguously incorporated TA's construction plans and 
identified the improvements in those plans as the improvements TA was required to 
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construct. The Bond Agreements also required the improvements to be completed 
within one or two years, depending on the phase. In addition, the plans incorporated into 
the Bond Agreements each required written change orders for any deviations from the 
plans. (Exs. 302A, 302B, 303-06, and 425 at Gen. Note 1.) That requirement made it 
more difficult for TA to prove waiver of a Bond Agreement duty than a Development 
Agreement duty. Because the jury could have found that the Bond Agreements' 
requirements differed from the Development Agreement's duties, it could have found that 
the City waived the Development Agreement public improvement requirements but not 
the Bond Agreement requirements. 
TA argues that "there is no basis for a distinction between the requirements of the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement^]" because the answer to SVF 
Question 1(h) means that "neither [the Development Agreement nor the Bond 
Agreements] provided TA with the standards necessary to "complete" the public 
improvements." (TA's Brf. 29.) Although TA is correct that the Development 
Agreement did not incorporate the construction plans, that is not true with respect to the 
Bond Agreements, and Question 1(h) does not support TA's argument. Question 1(h) 
asked whether the City breached the Development Agreement 
[b]y requiring [TA] to complete public improvements to standards that are 
not found within the Development Agreement, the approved construction 
33
 In support of its argument that "[b]oth agreements required construction of 
public improvements illustrated on the same documents," TA cites only the trial court's 
memorandum decision challenged on appeal, which obviously could not have been a 
basis on which the jury reached its findings. (TA's Brf. 28 (citing R. 24305-06).) 
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drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's ordinances and/or that are not 
required by other similarly situated developers. 
(R. 22163.) Clearly, what the answer to Question 1(h) means is that either the City 
required TA to complete public improvements to standards in addition to those found 
within any one or more of the listed sources, or that the City did not require other 
developers to comply with the same standards imposed upon TA. It does not mean that 
the construction plans were outside the Bond Agreements. Indeed, during oral argument 
on how the SVF may be reconciled, TA admitted, "remember that the Bond Agreements 
incorporate by reference the construction drawings." (R. 23295, p. 21.) 
TA included in the Pre-Trial Order its position that "[a] breach of the Bond 
Agreements or Bond Agreement Amendments may not be considered a breach of the 
Development Agreement and a breach of the Development Agreement may not be 
considered a breach of the Bond Agreement." (R. 21856, n.5.) In keeping with that 
position, TA elicited testimony that the Bond Agreements for Phases 1A and IB predated 
the Development Agreement and were excluded from the Development Agreement by 
virtue of the Development Agreement's integration clause. (R. 24339, pp. 1954-56, Ex. 
100, § XXI.) TA also pointed out that additions to the Development Agreement must be 
signed by the City's mayor after approval by the City Council, and there was no evidence 
of City Council approval of any of the Bond Agreements or Bond Agreement 
amendments, and some of the amendments lacked the mayor's signature. (R. 24339, pp. 
1954-55; Ex. 100 § XXI.) Thus, the jury was presented with conflicting views on 
whether the Bond Agreements were incorporated into the Development Agreement; it 
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was never instructed to adopt one view over the other; so it was free to adopt TA's view 
that "[a] breach of the Bond Agreements or Bond Agreement Amendments may not be 
considered a breach of the Development Agreement." (R. 21856, n.5.) 
d. The "Legal And Financial Consequences" Of "The Most 
Persuasive" SVF Interpretation Are Irrelevant. 
The trial court resisted the City's interpretation because the result "carries too 
much of legal and financial consequences." (R. 24308.) Under Utah law, such 
consequences are entirely irrelevant to either the harmonization analysis or the 
application of legal principles to jury findings. The legal and financial consequences of 
reconciling jury findings and applying legal principles were simply not factors in Judd ex. 
rel Montgomery v. Drezga, Dishinger v. Potter, Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 
Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., and Wright v. Westside Nursery, despite the fact that 
the outcomes of those decisions undoubtedly resulted in significant legal and financial 
consequences for the parties. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT IN TA'S FAVOR. 
Although the trial court erred by declining to enter judgment in the City's favor, it 
was correct to deny TA's motion for entry of judgment. TA's interpretation of the SVF 
is untenable. It conflicts with the plain language of the SVF and controlling Utah law, 
and Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) does not support it. In the alternative, if this Court is inclined 
to adopt TA's interpretation of the SVF, other grounds exist to affirm the trial court's 
decision striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial. 
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1. TA's Interpretation Of The SVF Is Untenable. 
In addition to supporting some of the trial court's reasons for not adopting the 
City's interpretation, TA contends that "waiver of claims of breach of both [the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements] is a viable option." (TA's Brf. 37.) 
TA argues that, unlike Question 3, Question 8 is "silent 'as far as breach'" and "only 
ask[s] whether the City waived its right to recover the costs to complete the public 
improvements," which, TA argues, is "the difference between substantial performance 
and complete performance." (TA's Brf. 22.) "[T]he key," TA says, is Instruction 35 on 
"substantial performance." (Id. at 24.) TA's interpretation fails for at least any one of 
the following five reasons. 
a. TA's Interpretation Ignores The Plain Language Of Questions 
2 And 3. 
Any interpretation that concludes that the City waived both its Bond Agreement 
claims and its Development Agreement claims cannot be squared with the plain terms of 
Questions 2, 3 and 8 and the answers thereto. TA's interpretation requires the Court to 
either disregard the phrase "as stated in Question 2," or torture the language in Question 2 
to exclude the references to "the Development Agreement" or add references to the Bond 
Agreements. An interpretation that requires the Court to add or subtract terms is not 
tenable. 
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b. TA's Interpretation Does Not Reconcile The Answers To 
Questions 3 And 8. 
TA argues that Questions 3 and 8 are consistent because, unlike Question 3, 
Question 8 was "silent 'as far as breach'" and "only ask[ed] whether the City waived its 
right to recover the costs to complete the public improvements." (TA's Brf. 22.) 
TA's interpretation simply does not work. First, Question 8 was not "silent" as to 
breach. Question 8 asked whether the City "waived its rights to claim that [TA] did not 
complete the public improvements in Overlake." (Emphasis added.) Waiving "rights to 
claim" means waiving, inter alia, a claim of breach. If a person waives his "rights to 
claim," he may not assert a breach; and, conversely, if a person does not waive "his rights 
to claim," he may assert a breach. 
TA's argument is internally inconsistent. If Question 8 did not encompass breach 
claims, as TA now asserts, then TA is wrong in arguing that Question 8 "only ask[s] 
whether the City waived its right "to recover the costs to complete the public 
improvements." (TA's Brf. 22.) The right "to recover the costs" depends upon a breach 
claim. If Question 8 means that the City preserved its right "to recover" costs, then it 
cannot be said that Question 8 is "silent as far as 'breach.'" 
Second, TA's argument that Question 8 "only ask[ed] whether the City waived its 
right to recover the costs to complete the public improvements" is flat wrong. Question 8 
asked whether the City waived "its rights to claim that [TA] did not complete the public 
improvements in Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the Bond 
Agreements?" To borrow TA's phrase, Question 8 was "silent as far as" "costs to 
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complete the public improvements." TA's argument requires the Court to interject a 
limitation that the plain language does not support. 
The answers to Questions 3 and 8 simply cannot be reconciled on the basis that 
Question 3 deals with breach claims and Question 8 does not. The only interpretation 
that reconciles these answers is the City's. 
c. "The Key" To TA's Interpretation Are The Legal Concepts 
That The Jury Instructions And SVF Confined To The 
Development Agreement. 
"[T]he key" to TA's interpretation is a jury instruction that, by its terms, has no 
application to the Bond Agreements. (Id at 24.) TA relies on Instruction 35 to argue 
that, under Questions 3 and 8, the jury found that TA "substantially performed" the Bond 
Agreements. TA also relies on Instructions 30 and 63 to argue that its Bond Agreement 
breaches were not "material." (Id. at 24, 26.) 
The answers to Questions 3 and 8 may not be reconciled based on the application 
of the "substantial performance" and "material breach" concepts to the Bond 
Agreements, because the jury instructions on those concepts were clear that they related 
solely to the Development Agreement. "We must assume that juries follow instructions, 
and that they do not 'consider and base their decisions on legal questions with respect to 
which they were not charged.'"34 De Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 451 (quoting Heller, 475 
U.S. at 798); Olson, 386 N.W.2d at 817; Delzer, 527 N.W.2d at 655-56. The jury was 
34
 TA itself cites authority for this proposition. (TA's Brf. at 39 n. 36 (citing Carr 
v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).) Cair holds that a jury "verdict will not be 
disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory. The theory, however, must 
be supported by the trial court's instructions to the jury." 904 P.2d at 503. 
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never instructed to consider and base their decisions regarding the Bond Agreements on 
the "substantial performance" and "material breach" concepts. According to Instructions 
30, 35, and 63, those concepts were confined to the issues surrounding the Development 
Agreement.35 In addition, as demonstrated above, TA waived a jury determination as to 
whether its Bond Agreement breaches were non-material or non-substantial. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 49(a). 
d. TA's Interpretation Depends Upon The Notion That The City 
Actively Interfered With TA's Public Improvement 
Construction, Which The Jury Rejected. 
Throughout TA's interpretation, TA insists that the SVF contains a finding that the 
City "actively interfered" with TA's public improvement construction. As demonstrated 
above, the jury nowhere indicated that the City somehow prevented TA from following 
its own construction plans. 
Moreover, far from reconciling SVF answers, TA's "active interference" 
argument, if adopted, would create conflict between the answers to Questions 1(e), (f), 
(g), and (h), upon which TA's argument is based, and Question 8. In response to 
Question 8, the jury found that TA had breached the Bond Agreements by failing to 
In any event, the jury's determination of the magnitude of TA's Bond 
Agreement breaches indicates that TA's breaches were "substantial." "A party has 
substantially performed when 'the only variance from the strict and literal performance 
consists of technical or unimportant omissions and defects.'" Reliance Ins. Co., 858 P.2d 
at 1370 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 1979)); see also R. 22209. Hence, 
a "non-substantial" breach would be a "technical or unimportant" omission or defect. 
The jury found that TA's Bond Agreement breaches caused $1.75 million in damages. 
Given the magnitude of TA's breaches, they simply cannot be characterized as "technical 
or unimportant omissions or defects." Thus, the SVF clearly indicates that TA's Bond 
Agreement breaches were "substantial" in nature. 
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complete public improvements. As shown above, if the jury believed that the City 
"actively interfered" with TA's construction work, the jury would have had to reach the 
opposite conclusion, under Instructions 33 and 44. TA's interpretation is not only 
untenable, but it just creates more conflicts. 
e. TA's Interpretation Is Premised On The Incorrect Notion 
That A Jury May Determine What A Party Is Entitled To 
Recover And Nullify Legal Principles That Bar A Recovery. 
TA argues that the answers to Questions 3 and 8 are reconcilable because "[b]y 
answering 'yes' to Question 3 the Jury found . .. that TA is entitled to recover damages," 
and under Question 8, "the Jury intended the City to be awarded completion damages 
under the theory of substantial completion." (TA's Brf. 22 n.23, 26.) TA's argument 
fundamentally conflates the roles of judge and jury. 
The jury was not asked and, under Utah law, has no authority to determine, what a 
party is "entitled to recover." Nowhere in the SVF was the jury asked what each party 
was "entitled to recover" or should "be awarded." Instead, the jury was asked to 
"[i]dentify the amount of... losses" or "the amount of damages . . . suffered" (R. 22166-
68.) 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely rejected the idea that "the jury's 
right to determine damages extends not only to a factual assessment of their amount, but 
also to an actual award of those damages." Judd ex rel. Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 
91, fflf 33-34, 103 P.3d 135. Instead, "it is the jury's duty to determine the amount of 
damages a plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's 
findings to applicable law." Id. ^ f 34. "'[Although a party has the right to have a jury 
50 
#278521 vl sic 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assess his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate through an award the legal 
consequences of its assessment.'" Id. ^ 33 (quoting Etheridge v. Med Ct. Hosp., 376 
S.E.2d525, 529 (Va. 1989)). 
It is the law which gives or withholds an award. . . . Instead of awarding 
damages to the plaintiff, the jury merely determined the amount of damages 
which he had sustained. 
Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397. Under Utah law, the SVF cannot be construed as a 
determination of what any party should receive or recover. 
2. The Jury Had No Authority To "Reject[]" The Law Of The Case 
That "'The Bond Agreements Do, Indeed, Vest Authority In The 
City To Deny Further Phases Based Upon Incomplete Public 
Improvements.'" 
TA argues that the SVF should be interpreted against the backdrop of the case as 
submitted to the jury. What that means, however, is that it must be presumed that the 
jury did not consider or base its findings on any legal concepts outside the jury 
instructions. Heller, 475 U.S. at 798; De Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 451; Olson, 386 N.W.2d 
at 817; Delzer, 527 N.W.2d at 655-56. Because the City's Bond Agreement right to deny 
further phases based upon incomplete public improvements was not before the jury, it 
must be presumed that the jury did not consider it in any of its findings and, hence, did 
not "reject[]" it. (TA's Brf. 52.) 
The only way the jury could have rejected the City's Bond Agreement right to 
deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements is if the jury was 
authorized to nullify the law of the case. Under controlling Utah law, juries simply have 
no such authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-103; Judd, 2004 UT 91, ^ 33-34; Brigham, 
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470 P.2d at 397-98; Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622-23; Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209, ffif 28-
30. The jury in this action had no more authority to nullify the law of the case than the 
jury in Judd had to nullify the statutory cap on medical malpractice recoveries; than the 
juries in Brigham and Milligan had to nullify the law of contributory negligence; or than 
the jury in Dishinger had to nullify the law of accord and satisfaction. 
The City preserved its Bond Agreement right by including it in the Pre-Trial 
Order. TA has cited no authority for the proposition that the City was required to do 
more to preserve such right, such as in a jury instruction.36 On the contrary, under 
Drezga, Brigham, Milligan, and Dishinger, it didn't matter whether or not jury 
instructions were given on the legal principles applied to jury findings. 
3. The SVF Was Submitted Under Rule 49(a); It Contains No 
General Verdict Under Rule 49(b). 
TA argues that the SVF actually contains general verdicts accompanied by special 
interrogatories under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) and the SVF answers that TA dislikes are 
"general verdicts" that should be disregarded in favor of the answers to the "special 
interrogatories" found in its favor.37 According to TA, the SVF contains general verdicts 
because the SVF asked mixed questions of law and fact, as opposed to just pure questions 
36
 TA should not be heard to bemoan the absence of a jury instruction with the 
City's Bond Agreement right to deny further phases. The City proposed such an 
instruction, but TA convinced the trial court not to give it. (R. 22104, 24341, pp. 2672-
75.) 
37
 TA's argument is ironic considering TA's stipulation to a jury instruction that 
provided "[t]his case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is 
sometimes done, but it will be your function in this case to make findings as to special 
questions which are submitted to you." (R. 22256.) 
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of fact, and the jury received instructions on legal concepts to apply to the facts. Under 
controlling Utah law, none of that means the SVF contains general verdicts. 
TA again incorrectly asserts that "there appears to be no published Utah opinions 
on this issue." (TA's Brf. 40.) In Milligan, the Utah Supreme Court held that, even 
though the jury answered mixed questions of law and fact, "we have no general verdict 
here." 335 P.2d at 622. The verdicts in Brigham and Dishinger were held to be special 
verdicts, which made it permissible for the courts to apply legal principles thereto, even 
though the verdicts contained answers to mixed questions of law and fact. Brigham, 470 
P.2d at 395, 397; Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209,1TC 7. 
The SVF contains no general verdicts, even under the authority TA cites. A 
general verdict is a verdict "whereby the jury find[s] either for the plaintiff or for the 
defendant in general terms." Black's Law Dictionary 1560 (6th ed. 1990); e.g., MUJI 
Form 36.6. According to TA's authorities, for a verdict to be a "general verdict," it must 
establish the "ultimate legal conclusions" of each or all claims in the case. E.g., Zhang v. 
Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Thus in a general verdict 
the jury announces only the prevailing party on a particular claim, and may announce 
damages."). 
TA can identify no SVF answer to any SVF question that establishes the "ultimate 
legal conclusion" of any claim. Mixed questions of law and fact are common in special 
verdict questions, as "[i]t long has been understood that law and fact are categories that 
are not so neatly separated." 9B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2506 (3d ed. 2010). "When 
questions of that type are submitted, there must be an accompanying instruction 
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explaining the legal standards to be applied by the jurors." Id. Thus, mixed questions of 
law and fact and jury instructions explaining the legal standards do convert any SVF 
answer into a "general verdict." 
4. The Trial Court's Ruling May Be Affirmed On Alternative 
Grounds. 
This Court may affirm the trial court's decision '"on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record.'" Lucero v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 1j 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting 
Limb v. Federated Milk Prod. Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)). In this case, 
this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the positive answer to Question 3; the jury's finding that the City 
breached the Development Agreement by refusing to consent to assignments of the 
Development Agreement was contrary to law and unsupported by evidence; and the 
jury's damages findings in SVF Question 5 are excessive. 
a. There Was No Evidence That The City Waived TA's Failure 
To Pay For Irrigation Water. 
Under Rule 59(a)(6), a new trial may be granted based on "[insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." As 
demonstrated above, there was absolutely no evidence presented at trial indicating that 
the City waived TA's material breach of the Development Agreement by failing to pay 
amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course. The jury, however, 
found that the City waived such claim in response to Question 3. Because the evidence is 
insufficient to justify that finding, the trial court's order for a new trial should be 
affirmed. 
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b. The Jury's Finding That The City Breached The 
Development Agreement By Refusing To Consent To 
Assignments Is Contrary To Law And Unsupported By 
Evidence. 
TA alleged, and the jury found in Question 1(b), that the City breached the 
Development Agreement "[b]y refusing to recognize and accept assignments of the 
Development Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes, Inc., L.H. 
Perry Investments, LLC and Overlake Golf, LLC." (R. 22162.) The City could not have 
breached the Development Agreement in that manner because the Development 
Agreement did not require the City to provide after-the-fact consent to assignments. 
The Development Agreement prohibited assignments "without the prior written 
consent of the City, which shall not be unreasonably withheld." (Ex. 100, § XVIII.) TA 
asked the City to consent to assignments of the Development Agreement for the first time 
on June 13, 2005, and again on September 5, 2006. (Exs. 515-16.) In all TA's evidence 
regarding its requests for consent to assignments, it presented no earlier request. (R. 
24333 pp.361-69; 24334, pp. 574-76; 24335 pp. 817-43, 898-906, 919-20, 955; 24336 pp. 
1012,1035-40; 24338 pp. 1553-56, 1599-1601.) TA judicially admitted, however, that 
by June, 2005, it had already assigned the Development Agreement in the manner 
reflected in its requests.38 (R. 3765-68, fflf 30-31, 34, 36-37, 39-43, and 46; 3823-25, fflf 
376-83.) Under Howe v. Professional Manivest Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), a party cannot be held to have breached a duty to give "prior consent" to 
I D 
The trial court held that TA was bound by such admissions throughout this case. 
(R. 10741 n.l.) 
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assignments if the assignments occurred prior to request for consent. Because the jury's 
answer to Question 1(b) was contrary to law and unsupported by evidence, the trial 
court's order for a new trial should be affirmed. 
c. The Jury's Calculation Of TA's Alleged Damages Was 
Excessive. 
In the Pre-Trial Order, TA limited its alleged damages to between $4,764,511.40 
and $6,700,124.40. (R. 3829, 21910-12.) At TA's urging, the trial court dismissed with 
prejudice "[a]ll claims n o t . . . presented and preserved by the June 11, 2009 Pre-Trial 
Order," including "[TA's] claims of damages other than the alleged damages disclosed in 
the June 11, 2009 Pre-Trial Order." (R. 24641-43.) The amounts that the jury found to 
be TA's alleged damages—$5 million and $17.5 million—greatly exceed the amount that 
TA could possibly recover under the Pre-Trial Order and the trial court's order of 
dismissal. (R. 22166.) 
Furthermore, TA's damages calculation was fundamentally flawed. TA advanced 
an expectancy, or benefit-of-the-bargain, measure of damages equivalent to the value of 
water per lot, multiplied by the number of lots that TA projected it would develop, 
discounted to present value. (R. 21909.) Under Utah law, any expectancy measure of 
damages must deduct the costs that the plaintiff avoids by not having to perform its 
contractual duties. Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, Tf 39, 98 P.3d 
39
 "Where a party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and 
timelines in order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the 
party waives his or her rights." Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, f 24, 186 P.3d 989; 
Deer Crest Assocs. L LC v. Silver Creek Dev. Group, LLC, 2009 UT App 356, f 9 and 
n.3, 222 P.3d 1184. 
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15; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774-75 (Utah 1986). In TA's case, the 
costs TA would avoid by not having to perform the Development Agreement include the 
costs of developing and constructing the public improvements. (R. 24334, pp. 41, 143-
44; 24335, pp.201-02.) TA unabashedly deducted none of those costs from its damages 
calculation. (R. 21909; 24337, p. 48.) As a result, the jury's finding of TA's alleged 
damages are clearly excessive. Accordingly, the trial court's order for a new trial should 
be affirmed. 
IX. CONCLUSION. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and direct the trial court to enter 
judgment in the City's favor for the amount of the damages that the jury found the City to 
have sustained. Otherwise, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling ordering a new 
trial because TA's interpretation of the SVF is untenable or, alternatively, certain jury 
findings lack evidentiary support or are contrary to law, and the amounts entered as TA's 
alleged damages are excessive. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011. 
George MiJ3aley / 
Christopher R. Hogle 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, Tooele City Corporation 
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FILED DISTKIU COUH 
Third Judicial District 
M 1 9 2009 
deputy Oeif' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TG0fcL£.ASSOClATI:S 1. 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
TOOELE CITY, et al.; 
Defendants. 
el al ) 
I 
- <l 
J 
i 
w 
1 
I 
I 
FORSGRliN ASSOCIATES. INC., et al.; ) 
I I i" hird-Party Defendants. 
TOOELE CITY; 
Third-Party Plaintiff. 
vs. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 060919737 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
At least six of the eight of you must agree to the answers to the questions below, but they 
need not be the same six on each question. Unless at least six of you agree, you may not return 
an answer to any question, 
We. the jury, find as follows: 
Section I: Tooele Associates' Claims, 
I. Mas Tooele Associates proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele City 
materially breached the Development Agreement, including its implied covenant of good 
faith and lair dealing? 
YES: j s , NO: 
* If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II. 
# If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele City breached the 
Development Agreement: 
By refusing to recognize and accept as complete the public improvements in the 
Overlake Project Area subdivisions Overtake Estates Phases IB, IC, ID, IE. IF 
or IG? 
NO: A 
By refusing to recognize and approve assignments of the Development 
Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes. Inc., 1..H. Perry 
Investments, LLC and Overlake GolL LLC? 
NO: 
By failing and refusing to extend the term of the Development Agreement 
pursuant to Section XXIII of the Development Agreement? 
NO: 
& 
*ht-,im-'t']f" 
YES: 
§,: 
YES 
c. 
YES X 
*Z5p^ v I! sic 
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4. By creating arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions'? 
YES: NO 
YES:V 
E S ^ 
YES: 
YES: 
YES: 
YES: 
X 
|:-; 
"-i*S-
1^1 
_ 
k. 
4 
By slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions? 
S:  NO; 
f* By misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement ordinances in 
relation to the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions? 
Y S: X NO; 
:g. By refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public improvements 
within the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete? 
YES: ¥ NO: 
:itir By requiring Tooele Associates to complete public improvements to standards 
that arc not found vuthiu the Development Agreement, the approved construction 
drawings, the Bond Agreements or the Cits "s Ordinances and or thai are not 
required of other similarly situated developers? 
NO: 
By refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for the creation of 
new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area? 
NO; 
By finding and asserting that Tooele Associates had materially breached the 
Development Agreement? 
>4-NO:_ 
By asserting mcritlcss, trivial and frivolous claims against Tooele Associates? 
NO:jL 
*2$tA$5 v 11 *k 
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By failing to commence site design and site improvements within 180 days ol^ 
Tooele Associates' transfer to the City of land donations provided earlier than 
final plat or final site plan approval? 
^ 
YES: V NO: 
H Has Tooele City proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates 
materially breached the Development Agreement? 
>: K YES: *V NO; 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, skip to Question 4. 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele Associates breached the 
Development Agreement: 
ii, By failing to complete public improvements in Overlake pursuant to Sections 
VII.2 and VIII.2 of the Development Agreement? 
YES: NO 4-
b. By failing to comply with the requirements for the approval of subdivision plats 
and site plans and all other applicable ordinances, resolutions, policies, and 
procedures of Tooele City, pursuant to Sections IILG and XVII of the 
Development Agreement? 
a 
YES: Y NO: 
By failing to set aside and provide land in Overlake for public uses, including lor 
public schools, pursuant to Sections IX.2, X.2. and XE2 of the Development 
Agreement? 
YES: NO •x 
C By assigning portions of the Development Agreement to one or more parties 
without the prior written consent of Tooele Cit> pursuant to Section XVIII of the 
Development Aizreement? 
x • YES: NO 
•*HW*l<tHI; m 
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e> By failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overtake Golf 
Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment &4 to the Development Agreement*? 
*-i YES; V NO: C By failing to construct a golf course on approximately 258 acres of land in 
Overtake pursuant to Section X.B of the Development Agreement? 
Yes: No: X 
1. Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, as 
stated in Question 2. that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development 
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements? 
YES: h NO: 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 4. 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section 11. 
4 Has Tooele Associates proven to a reasonable certainty: 
the amount of losses Tooele Associates has suffered as a result of Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to May 15, 2009? 
YES: K NO; 
the amount of losses Tooele Associates will suffer as a result of Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement from May 15, 2009. to 2017? 
YES: K NO: 
If you answered "YES" to either portion of this Question, continue on to Question 5. 
If you answered "NO" to both portions of this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY 
MORE QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II. 
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5i Identify the amount of Tooele Associates' historic and future losses: 
& Historic loss: What losses has Tooele Associates proven that it has suffered as a 
result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to Mav 
15,2009? 
S *Q \ \\s\yt>|M{ (d° not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.a) 
fe Future loss: What future losses has Tooele Associates proven that it will suffer as 
a result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from May 15, 
2009, to 2017? 
o not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.b) 
H ,<?<£>! ceo 
Section II: The City's Claims. 
•$< Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached the Bond Agreements and Bond 
Agreement amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake? 
a, YES: I NO: 
%f Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Sections II1.G, VI1.2, VI11.2, 
and XVII of the Development Agreement by failing to complete public improvements in 
Overlake? 
YES: \ NO: E S : 4 
* If you answered "YES" to this Question or Question 6, continue on to Question 8. 
• If you answered '"NO" to this Question and Question 6, skip to Question 11. 
Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to claim that Tooele 
Associates did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements? 
YES: NO: ^ 
• 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, continue on to Question 9. 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, skip to Question 11. 
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9, Has Tooele City proven to a reasonable certainty the amount ofcosts that it will have to 
incur to complete public improvements in Overtake required by the Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreements? 
YF-SOi NO: 
• If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 10. 
» If you answered "NO" to this Question, please skip to Question 11, 
10. What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates' 
breach of the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements based upon Tooele 
Associates* failure to complete public improvements in Overtake? 
I i, Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Section 8 of Amendment #4 to 
the Development Agreement by failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate 
the Overtake Golf Course? 
* If you answered "YKS" to this Question, continue on to Question 12, 
• If you answered "NO" to this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict 
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict, 
12. Has Tooele Cit) proven to a reasonable certainty the amounts owed b) Tooele Associates 
for water used to irrigate the Overtake Golf Course? 
Y E S : . ^ NO:. 
* If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 13. 
6 
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* If you answered i;N(T to this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Speeial Verdict 
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict. 
IX What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates' 
failure to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course? 
% T ' .ncD 
Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Speeial Verdict and alert the courtroom 
deputy that you have arrived at a verdict. 
DATED this J$ day of June, 2009. 
/ 
Foreptfp&n V> 
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